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SOME REALISM ABOUT EMPIRICISM 
Carl Tobias" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1983 revision to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure proved to be the most controversial amendment to the Federal 
Rules since their adoption a half-century ago. In the years following the 
revision's adoption, however, an absence of empirical data on the 
Rule's application complicated assessment of its precise consequences. 
The 1992 publication of The Use and Impact of Rule I I ("the article"), 
by Lawrence Marshall, Herbert Kritzer, and Frances Kahn Zemans, 
ameliorated this empirical deficiency.' The article set forth many im-
portant findings from the most comprehensive empirical study of Rule 
11 ever performed. The study, conducted under the auspices of the 
American Judicature Society (AJS), affords insights that implicate feder-
al civil procedure, the Federal Rules revision process, and federal court 
legal culture.2 The study's effect on the 1993 revision to Rule 11 war-
rants particular attention. The lessons derived from this recent revision 
process will inform future efforts to revise Rule 11 and other Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans study, therefore, should be of compel-
ling interest to a broad spectrum of individuals and entities that are 
concerned about the federal courts. These include persons involved in 
the courts' day-to-day activities, such as federal judges who apply the 
Federal Rules and attorneys who must practice under the provisions. 
The study should also be of value to individuals, such as students of 
modem disputing and observers of the three-year process of Federal 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Sally Johnson and Peggy 
Sanner for their valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmenon for processing 
this piece; and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain arc mine. 
1. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., 171e Use and Impact of Rule II, 86 Nw. U. L REv. 943 
(1992). 
2. The article is a significant component of n larger study. The authors ha\'e discussed 
some of the findings in the article elsewhere. See, e.g., Hcrben M. Kritzer ct al., Rule II: 
Moi•ing Beyond tire Cosmic Anecdote, 15 JUDICATURE 269 (1992). See generally Marshall, s11pra 
note I, at 943. 
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Rules revlSlon, as well as institutions, such as the Judicial Conference 
and the Rand Corporation, which evaluate the efficacy of federal court 
procedures.3 Finally, policymaking bodies, such as the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), which evaluate the 
rules and propose suggestions for their improvement, have relied on the 
study's findings. 
Because the Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans study has been quite signifi-
cant and will probably continue to be influential, their article warrants 
close analysis. This Essay is primarily a respectful critique, which em-
phasizes the authors' assertions regarding empirical data. The Essay 
briefly describes the article and then assesses certain of its claims that 
principally implicate empirical information. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ARTICLE 
The article's introduction expresses concern about "dramatically 
conflicting accounts" of the actual effects of Rule 11, as amended in 
1983, on federal civil practice and about the failure of much academic 
literature to address this problem.4 Because those responsible for rule 
revision were at the time developing a proposal to modify Rule 11 and 
needed systematic empirical data on which to premise decisionmaking,5 
Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans found particularly significant the lack of 
pertinent material on the rule's use and impact. The authors, according-
ly, intended that their findings afford a "foundation for further scholarly 
analysis in this area, as well as necessary information for those ... 
considering Rule 11 reforms."6 
The authors initially explored the background of Rule 11 's 1983 amend-
ment, examining certain purposes the rule revisers sought to achieve.7 
3. See, e.g., Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(c)(3), 104 
Stat. 5089, 5096 (1990) (requiring Judicial Conference to "prepare a report on the plans devel-
oped and implemented by the Early Implementation District Courts" under the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990); id. § 105(c), 104 Stat. 5098 (requiring that study of ten pilot courts 
implementing Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 be performed by "an independent organization 
with expertise in the area of Federal court management"). 
4. Marshall, supra note I, at 943-44. The authors explained that the analysis of judicial 
opinions-the mainstay of traditional legal scholarship-had not facilitated evaluation of Ruic 11 
activity in the courtroom, much less outside of it. Id. at 944. 
5. Id. at 944. The 1993 amendment of Rule 11 became effective on December l, 1993. See 
Notice Concerning Amendments to Federal Rules, 151 F.R.D. 145 (1993); see also Supreme 
Court of the United States, Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II, 146 F.R.D. 401, 
419-24 (1993). 
6. Marshall, supra note 1, at 946. 
7. Id. at 946-49. 
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The authors correctly concluded that the drafters meant to reduce litiga-
tion abuse by requiring lawyers to conduct reasonable legal and factual 
inquiries before filing papers and by mandating that judges sanction 
attorneys who violated the Rule.8 
The authors next explained the methodology of their study.9 The 
study was conducted in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, thereby 
affording geographical diversity and variability in the perceived inci-
dence of Rule 11 activity. 10 The authors sought to guarantee variation 
within the circuits by choosing several districts: one with a metropolitan 
city; a second including middle-sized urban communities; and a third 
having a predominantly non-urban population. 11 They asked 4,500 fed-
eral court litigators questions regarding their personal experiences with 
Rule 11 and how the provision had affected their practices and con-
duct 12 The response rate was seventy-five percent, a figure considered 
to be very high. 13 
The authors examined the study's general findings concerning the 
Rule's use.14 They considered significant the frequency of formal Rule 
11 activity, both in terms of the motions filed and the sanctions im-
posed.15 The authors determined that counsel for plaintiffs were the 
target of Rule 11 activity much more frequently than defense attor-
neys.16 The authors concomitantly ascertained that there was consider-
able informal Rule 11 activity and that lawyers for plaintiffs were again 
"far more likely to be the target."17 The authors concluded that ninety-
five percent of the sanctions imposed were monetary but asserted that 
this amount was smaller than "many media accounts of sensational 
8. Id. at 947-48. See also FED. R. C1v. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983). 
9. Marshall, supra note l, at 949-51. 
10. Id. at 949-50; see also infra notes 30-34 and accompanying tcxl. 
11. The districts surveyed within the Fifth Circuit included the Western District of Louisiana. 
the Northern District of Mississippi, and the Southern District of Tcxas: the districts \\ithin the 
Seventh Circuit included the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of Indiana. and 
the Western District of Wisconsin; the districts within the Ninth Circuit included the District of 
Arizona, the District of Montana, the Eastern District of California. the Districl of Oregon. and 
the Central District of California. Marshall, supra no1e l, at 950. The authors selected two 
, additional districts in the Ninth Circuit "because of its unique size and di\·ersily." Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. This figure evidenced lawyers' keen in1ercs1 in Rule 11. Id. at 945. 
14. Id. at 951-60. 
15. Id. at 951-52. Fonnal activity includes proposals 10 sanction through counsel's motion or 
a judge's show cause order. Id. at 951. 
16. For example, counsel for plaintiffs were the target in 70 percent of the cases in which 
courts imposed sanctions. Id. at 953. 
17. Id. at 956. 
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cases may lead some to imagine."18 
The authors also explored the Rule's impact on the practice of 
law. 19 The greatest effect was on the amount of factual investigation 
attorneys undertook before asserting claims or defenses.20 Nearly twen-
ty percent of the lawyers surveyed had refused to present a claim or 
defense which they believed had merit out of concern about Rule 11.21 
The authors correspondingly considered variables in the nature of the 
case and practice.22 They determined that nearly twenty-three percent 
of the suits in which courts levied sanctions involved civil rights, al-
though those cases constituted only 11.4 percent of the actions filed.23 
The authors characterized as "surprising" the finding that judges im-
posed sanctions in an identical ratio for a different classification of 
lawsuits labelled "other commercial cases," which involve, for example, 
antitrust claims, corporations and banking law, and securities issues.24 
Nonetheless, the authors described as "unique" the substantial discrepan-
cy in the effect the Rule has had on the practices of counsel who rep-
resent civil rights plaintiffs and defendants.25 
The study explored numerous additional factors regarding attorneys' 
practice environment and experience to ascertain their relevance.26 En-
vironmental considerations, including law firm size, community size, 
and district size, seemed to have little effect.27 As to experiential fac-
tors, the authors concluded that attorneys with prior Rule 11 experience 
were more likely to have modified their conduct.28 
The authors also evaluated variations in the Rule's employment and 
effects in the three circuits surveyed.29 The results were consistent 
with the reputations of the circuits: the Seventh Circuit was found to be 
the most aggressive enforcer; the Ninth Circuit was the most lenient; 
18. Id. at 956-57. The median sanction was $2,500. Id. at 957. 
19. l<i. at 960-65. 
20. Id. at 960, 964. 
21. Id. at 961. Sixty and sixth-tenths percent of the respondents had taken some important 
action during the prior year in response to Rule 11. I<i. at 961. 
22. Id. at 965-75. 
23. Id. at 965-66. 
24. Id. at 966-67. The authors posited several explanations for this finding, none of which 
they seemed to consider satisfactory. See id. at 966-68. 
25. Id. at 971-75. "(C]ivil rights defense lawyers appear to be disproportionately unaffected 
by Rule 11." l<i. at 971. 
26. Id. at 975-80. 
27. Id. at 975-79. 
28. Id. at 980. 
29. Id. at 981-85. 
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and the Fifth Circuit occupied the middle ground.30 The incidence of 
cases in which courts imposed sanctions was considerably higher in the 
Seventh Circuit.31 Nonetheless, lawyers in the Fifth Circuit were most 
responsive to Rule 11,32 although the authors ultimately found "no 
dispositive explanation for the high level of reaction."33 
The article concludes with several general propositions that the 
authors deemed worthy of repetition.34 Even though the authors ascer-
tained that plaintiffs had been the targets of Rule 11 activity consider-
ably more often than defendants, lawyers who typically represent either 
plaintiffs or defendants responded similarly to the Rule, with the signifi-
cant exception of civil rights attomeys.3s Moreover, the authors found 
that the experiences of those polled strongly suggested that much of the 
portrayal of the impact of Rule 11 was "significantly skewed."36 The 
authors did not purport to resolve the ultimate normative issue of 
whether the 1983 Rule's benefits had outweighed its disadvantages but 
asserted that the study had afforded systematic evidence regarding the 
reality of the provision in operation.37 The article closes by impor-
tuning decisionmakers and scholars to premise their judgments about 
Rule H's imminent revision on "evidence-not conjecture or anec-
dotes-about" the Rule's employment and effects, because policymaking 
that was not based on empirical reality would be ineffective and pro-
duce unintended consequences.38 
Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans made a substantial contribution. They 
carefully collected, analyzed and synthesized an enormous quantity of 
invaluable empirical data on Rule 11 's use and impact. It is difficult to 
overstate the importance of the type of endeavor they undertook. The 
development of questionnaires, their circulation, the compilation of 
responses, the interpretation of statistical information, and the derivation 
of conclusions from that data are relatively unglamorous and onerous 
30. Id. at 981. 
31. Courts in the Seventh Circuit imposed sanctions in 24.5% of the cases as compared with 
courts in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that did so in 14.6C:O and 14.4% n:sp:clivcly. Id. 
32. Id. at 982. 
33. Id. at 985. 
34. Id. at 985-86. 
35. The other general ideas are thal geographic selling is strikingly importanl to Ruic 11 
activity and that more than 80% of the respondents stated that the Ruic had affected their prac-
tices. Id. at 985. 
36. Id. For example, the authors stated tha1 lawyers devote linlc time to Ruic 11. that 
sanctions' imposition has been limited. and that mos1 sanctions arc modest. Id. 
37. Id. at 985-86. 
38. Id. at 986. 
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tasks, yet they are vital. The authors' efforts elevated the level of de-
bate over Rule 11, a debate that had generated more heat than light. 
There was a compelling need for the type of "real world" data on 
Rule 11 gathered by the authors. Although much can be learned from 
the collection of empirical evidence on Rule 11 's formal invocation, the 
overwhelming majority of Rule 11 activity since 1983 has been infor-
mal. Empirical data on the Rule's informal use was, therefore, critical 
to the work of public policymakers, such as the Advisory Committee 
on the Civil Rules, in formulating the most effective proposal to amend 
the Rule. Much of the Rule 11 activity that had been most controver-
sial, such as informal threats to invoke Rule 11 against civil rights 
plaintiffs, could have chilled civil rights plaintiffs' enthusiasm. The 
authors reported, for example, that Rule 11 had led civil rights attor-
neys to advise clients not to pursue potentially meritorious claims and 
even forego suit.39 
In short, Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans compiled, evaluated and 
synthesized a wealth of essential information on the employment and 
effects of the 1983 amendment of Rule 11. This material yielded infor-
mative insights which implicated propositions principally related to the 
theory and practice of, and institutions involved in, Federal Rules revi-
sion. Several of the issues raised by their study warrant additional con-
sideration. The following section briefly attempts to explore one of the 
most important issues and to show how it was addressed in the most 
recent Federal Rules amendment process. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE 
As stated above, very little empirical data on the impact of Rule 11 
had been assembled before Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans published 
their study. There was, accordingly, a compelling need for the type of 
experiential data provided by the authors. There was also a need to 
interpret and analyze the empirical information collected, so that public 
policymakers could transform the data into effective proposals for rule 
revision. Unfortunately, the authors drew comparatively few conclusions 
from much of the data they reported. Moreover, the material on which 
the authors premised the conclusions that they did reach is open to 
varying interpretation. Furthermore, the authors seemed to understate the 
significance of certain information they gathered, leaving readers with 
the impression that important inferences should not be derived from 
39. Id. at 973. 
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some of the data. 
The civil rights area is illustrative. Considerable raw data that Mar-
shall, Kritzer, and Zemans assembled lent empirical support to the 
informal observations of numerous judges and writers that the 1983 
Rule had disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs.40 The authors, however, 
did not so state and seemed to draw different conclusions from certain 
relevant information. For example, the authors found that courts im-
posed monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 even more often (ninety-
five percent of the cases) than was believed but asserted that the 
amount of the sanctions was apparently much lower than many had 
assumed. 41 The authors characterized as "relatively modest [the] 
amount of money involved in the majority of sanctions cases" and 
noted that the median sanction was $2,500. They remarked that the 
"bar's reaction to Rule 11 ha[d] been fueled by the horror stories of the 
extremely unusual sanctions that exceed $1,000,000."42 I would sug-
gest, although the authors did not, that significant inferences for civil 
rights plaintiffs can be derived from these statements and the informa-
tion on which they are premised. For instance, a single parent. who 
believes that she has suffered employment discrimination and pursues 
litigation to vindicate substantive rights to be free from discrimination, 
will not consider modest a $2,500 sanction. 
Judicial imposition of substantial sanctions on Julius Chambers, 
Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and William 
Kunstler, the renowned civil rights attorney, in separate civil rights 
cases,43 also chilled civil rights lawyers who were understandably con-
cerned when courts penalized the ablest among them.44 Shockwaves 
have reverberated as well through the public interest law community 
40. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 {7th Cir. 1987J 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting), cen. dismissed, 48S U.S. 90 (1988); Carl Tobias. Rule 11 and Civil 
Rights litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 48S (1988·89). See generally Erle K. Yamamoto, 
Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Couns for Minorities, 2S HARV. C.R.·C.L L 
REv. 341 (1990). 
41. Marshall, supra note l, at 946. 
42. Id. at 9S7. 
43. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the Anny, 914 F.2d S2S (4th Cir. 1990). cen. de· 
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1S80 (1991); ln re Kunstler, 914 F.2d SOS (4th Cir. 1990), cen. denied, Ill 
s. Ct. 1607 (1991). 
44. See, e.g., Melissa L Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule I I-Some "Chilling" Prob-
- /ems in the Struggle BeMeen Compensation and Punishment. 14 GEO. LI. 1313, 1327, 1340 
(1986); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988); Ste-
phen Labaton, Solution to Wasteful Lawsuits Becomes a Problem, N.Y. n.~tES, June 14. 1992. at 
E2. 
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since 1989 when a judge levied a $1,000,000 sanction on public inter-
est litigants. 45 
The experience with Rule 11 's impact on civil rights plaintiffs, 
accordingly, demonstrates that empirical data alone, even once interpret-
ed, will not suffice to support the public policy determinations that are 
so critical to the revision of a controversial rule of civil procedure. 
Some considerations important to efficacious decisionmaking cannot be 
empirically measured. Certain factors may resist quantification or verifi-
cation. Others will require value judgments. It is legitimate and indeed 
imperative to consult, integrate, and apply additional relevant sources in 
formulating the best public policy decisions on rule revision. The most 
pertinent inquiry becomes ascertaining which sources are appropriate. 
As to these propositions, the efforts to develop an effective proposal 
that led to Rule 11 's amendment are highly instructive.46 The Adviso-
ry Committee first commissioned the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to 
conduct a comprehensive Rule 11 study, which was similar to that 
performed by Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans. The committee also issued 
a call for comment, soliciting public input on the Rule's possible revi-
sion.47 The committee diligently reviewed the FJC's findings and the 
public's suggestions. The panel circulated a preliminary draft proposal 
for public comment;48 received written and oral public input; and sig-
nificantly revised this draft during May 1991. 
In June 1992, the Advisory Committee presented a new proposal to 
the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
which adopted most of the Advisory Committee's recommendations, 
with the important exception of leaving to judicial discretion the impo-
sition of sanctions.49 Many features included in that proposal, which 
45. See Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1989), ajf'd, 932 F.2d 1572 
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992). 
46. In this paragraph I rely substantially on Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. Ml· 
AMI L. REV. 855, 858-97 (1992) [hereinafter Reconsidering] and on Carl Tobias, Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11. 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775 (1992) [hereinafter 
Proposed]. These sources include citations to all of the relevant primary sources, a few of 
which I include here. 
47. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITIEB 
ON CIVIL RULES OF TIIE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991) [hereinafter FJC 
REPORT]; Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro· 
cedure, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990). This was important, as the Committee inverted the 
normal sequence of initially developing a proposal and then seeking public comment. 
48. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 137 
F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991). See generally Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 865-97. 
49. See Randall Sambom, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L LJ., July 6, 1992. at 13. 
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eventually became the amended Federal Rule 11. are solicitous of the 
needs of civil rights plaintiffs. The Federal Rule amendment, therefore, 
substantially improved the 1983 Rule and was considerably better than 
the May 1991 draft.so 
Most relevant was the apparent willingness of both committees to 
consult, integrate, and apply information from sources other than em-
pirical data. Each committee, of course, relied substantially on the mate-
rial generated by the FJC and Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans studies. Had the 
committees depended exclusively or even primarily on this information, 
however, they would not have adopted proposals which appear so solic-
itous of civil rights plaintiffs. For instance, neither the FJC study nor 
the Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans article left the impression that Rule 11 had 
substantially disadvantaged, much less disproportionately affected, civil 
rights plaintiffs.s1 Rather than rely solely on the empirical studies, the 
two committees participated in the type of rule revision process that 
Congress expressly prescribed in the Judicial Improvements and Access 
to Justice Act of 1988.s2 They carefully drafted proposals, sought and 
seriously considered public comment, modified the drafts in light of 
that input, and hammered out workable proposals in the crucible of 
public debate. The committees listened closely to all segments of the 
organized bar: plaintiffs, defense, civil rights, and public interest, as 
well as corporations, government representatives, and the public. 
Members of both committees apparently found that empirical infor-
mation alone was insufficient and therefore consulted additional sources. 
More specifically, they seemingly heard the "Call of Stories" involving 
Rule 11.53 Many of these incidents were neither reported in the ad-
vance sheets nor retrievable on computerized services. However, a num-
In September, the Judicial Conference approved without change the proposal fonnulared in June. 
In April 1993, the Supreme Court transmined to Congress the amendment of Federal Rule 11 
which became effective on December I, 1993. See supro note 5. Bills that would have post-
poned the amendment's effective date for one year were introduced. but the legislation did not 
pass. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2979, 103d Cong., 1st Scss. (1993). 
SO. See generally Proposed, supra note 46; Reconsidering, supro nore 46. 
51. See, e.g., FJC REPoRT, supra nole 47, §§ IA-IC; Marshall, supra nole I, al 946, 957; 
see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying texL Biii see Marshall, supm note I. al 973; 
supra notes 23-25 and accompanying texL 
52. Pua. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified al 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-78 (1988}). See 
generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope 01·er Experience: Mandatory /nfonnol Discoi·ery and the 
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795. 854 (1991). 
53. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 19 CAL. L REv. 971 (1991): see also 
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L REv. 901 (1992) (the story of In re Kunstler): 
cf. Kritzer, supra note 2 (characterizing much Rule 11 debate as consisting of cosmic anec-
dotes). See generally Symposium on Legal Storytelling. 87 MICH. L REv. 2073 (1989). 
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ber of these cases were reported or were available on computerized 
services, and a few of them were sensational, especially in terms of the 
size of the sanctions levied.54 Perhaps the rule revisers understood that 
data regarding some of this Rule 11 activity was notoriously difficult to 
collect, evaluate, and synthesize; that chilling effects were not reducible 
to precise empirical validation; and that the Rule's impact on civil 
rights plaintiffs may have been obscured by the way that certain empiri-
cal information was presented.5s They might also have appreciated that 
a modest sanction could bankrupt impecunious litigants or that news 
travels fast in the public interest law and civil rights communities, 
particularly when judges impose large sanctions on their foremost advo-
cates.56 
Indeed, a telling moment in the rule revision process came during 
the May 1991 meeting at which the Advisory Committee crafted its 
preliminary draft proposal.57 One lengthy discussion in which most 
committee members participated indicated that they believed the percep-
tion that Rule 11 was chilling civil rights plaintiffs was sufficient to 
warrant possible amendment, even if that fact could not be empirically 
verified. This decision was appropriate, given congressional intent clear-
ly expressed in many civil rights statutes that the judiciary facilitate 
plaintiffs' vindication of their substantive rights.ss 
I am neither criticizing the outstanding contribution made by Mar-
shall, Kritzer, and Zemans nor denigrating the value of empirical data. 
Both are immensely important. I do believe, however, that the material 
assembled must be interpreted to inform public policy choices that are 
ultimately made. Concomitantly, the significance of certain findings, 
such as the meaning for civil rights plaintiffs of even a few substantial 
sanctions or a larger number of modest ones, should not be under-
54. See supra notes 43 & 45 and accompanying text. 
55. For example, reliance on the median, rather than the mean. sanctioning amounts can 
understate the importance for civil rights plaintiffs of even a small number of large sanctions. 
See Marshall, supra note I. at 957: see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; infra 
note 59 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra notes 43 & 45 and accompanying text. 
57. I rely substantially in this paragraph on notes that I took while attending the Advisory 
Committee meeting. See generally Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 857 n.2. 
58. See, e.g .. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pue. L. No. 102-166. 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (Supp. IV 1992). See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Subs/Clnce 
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substamive and Procetlural Law in Title VII 
Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 801 (1992). 
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stated.59 
There must be more and better infonnation and increased and re-
fined analysis of all sorts that will improve important public 
policymaking. We need systematically collected empirical data, but we 
also must hear the Call of Stories. Researchers might even closely 
analyze case files in high profile civil rights cases or interview the 
lawyers, litigants, and judges involved in those suits.60 Decisionmakers 
must listen to all interests affected by rule revision and draft changes 
that are as responsive as possible to those interests while remembering 
congressional intent expressed in substantive statutes, such as civil 
rights legislation. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans significantly advanced the highly 
controversial debate over the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule 11. 
Public policymakers properly relied on the valuable empirical data that 
the authors collected, analyzed, and synthesized. They were also correct 
to consult, evaluate, and integrate relevant material apart from empirical 
information that could be found in other sources, such as stories involv-
ing the imposition of significant Rule 11 sanctions in civil rights cases. 
When decisionmakers consider and apply all of this available material, 
they are able to formulate the most efficacious proposals for rule revi-
sion. 
59. See supra notes 43-45, 53-56 and accompanying texL 
60. The Center for Constitutional Rights proposed to undertake such a study but discontinued 
this effort once the Call for Comments issued. See Tobias, supra note 40, at 525 n.151. 
